

NSC-1826

DD/S&amp;T# 1670-1,1

Executive Registry

79-6007/3

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 2, 1979

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Augmenting FBIS's South Asian Capabilities (U)

I have noted your memorandum of 21 March 1979 on this subject. While proposing an FBIS bureau in Pakistan is undesirable when we are pursuing the possibility of a fallback position for the lost Iranian sites, it does not seem to me that the two operations necessarily conflict. If the Pakistanis should prove cooperative on highly sensitive technical capabilities, I should think there might also be a fair chance that they might also agree to the much less politically sensitive establishment of overt monitoring capabilities. I recommend you at least keep this possibility open. (S)

Meanwhile, I urge you to take at least temporary measures to improve monitoring from the whole South and Central Asian area. The value of having this overtly obtainable information as rapidly as possible is even more obvious than it was when I sent you my memorandum of 14 November 1978. Instability and political ferment have meanwhile increased throughout the whole area, notably in Afghanistan and Iran, but also in Pakistan and in respect to the Kurdish issue which may come to affect countries such as Turkey and Iraq. We also continue to need more timely coverage of broadcasts from the Soviet Caucasus and Central Asia and from the Soviet-Chinese border area. (S)

Please report by 1 May 1979 all measures you are able to take to improve FBIS coverage of all these targets. (C)



Zbigniew Brzezinski

cc: Sec of State

SECRET

Review on 26 March 1983

NSC review completed.

NSC-1826

DD/S&T# 1670-5

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REFERENCE

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